FOUNDING CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF WASHINGTON, D. C., a not-for-profit
corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, an Illinois not-for-profit Corporation, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 77-561.
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.
May 17, 1978.
Appeal was taken from an order of the Circuit Court, Cook County, Daniel P.
Coman, J., dismissing with prejudice a complaint sounding in libel and
interference with contractual relationships. The Appellate Court, Simon, J.,
held that: (1) where the allegedly defamatory article was published generally
and released in 1968, neither the plaintiff's original charge nor its amended
complaint that a "reprint" of the article was distributed "within the last
year" were sufficient to give rise to a new cause of action in 1975; (2) the
one-year statute of limitations on the alleged libel began to run in December
of 1968 and thus the suit was barred, and (3) the complaint failed to state a
cause of action for tortious interference with contractual relationships.
Affirmed.
[1] ACTION
Rationale for Uniform Single Publication Act is that cause of action for libel
is complete at time of first publication, and any subsequent appearances or
distributions of copies of original publication are of no consequence to
creation or existence of cause of action, but are only relevant in computing
damages; thus, subsequent distribution of existing copies of original
publication neither creates fresh cause of action nor tolls applicable statute
of limitations. S.H.A. ch. 126, s 11.
[1] LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
Rationale for Uniform Single Publication Act is that cause of action for libel
is complete at time of first publication, and any subsequent appearances or
distributions of copies of original publication are of no consequence to
creation or existence of cause of action, but are only relevant in computing
damages; thus, subsequent distribution of existing copies of original
publication neither creates fresh cause of action nor tolls applicable statute
of limitations. S.H.A. ch. 126, s 11.
[2] LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
Where allegedly defamatory article was published generally and released in
1968, charge that publisher caused reprints and copies of article to be
delivered, distributed and published to three named persons "within the last
year" was not sufficient to give rise to new cause of action in 1975 under
theory that reprints could be considered to constitute "second edition" or "new
publication." S.H.A. ch. 126, s 11.
[3] LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
Where original publication of allegedly defamatory article occurred in 1968,
and where copies mailed seven years later were not sufficient to be termed
"republication" giving rise to new cause of action for libel, statute of
limitations began to run in 1968 and time for bringing suit expired one year
later; complaint alleging libel, which was not filed until 1975, was barred by
statute of limitations. S.H.A. ch. 83, s 14; ch. 126, s 11.
[4] PLEADING
Complaint which fails to allege sufficient facts to show plaintiff is entitled
to recovery does not state cause of action, and such deficiency may not be
remedied by liberal construction or by argument. S.H.A. ch. 110, s 31.
[5] PLEADING
Although complaint need not contain evidentiary matter or allege facts
precisely, it must have enough nonconclusory factual allegations to demonstrate
how plaintiff has been harmed, and that harm resulted from some violation of
legal duty by defendant. S.H.A. ch. 110, s 31.
[6] TORTS
Complaint alleging that defendant's publication of allegedly defamatory article
interfered with, and caused termination of plaintiff organization's contractual
relationship with its actual and prospective members, but which set forth no
statements indicating what contract deserving of legal protection was involved,
failed to state cause of action for malicious, intentional and willful
interference with contractual relationships.
*587 **159 ***6 Brizius & Nixon, Chicago (Charles W. Nixon, Chicago, of
counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.
Richard J. Phelan, Michael A. Pope, Roseann Oliver, Chicago (Phelan & Pope and
Sidley & Austin, Chicago, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.
SIMON, Justice:
The core of this case is the applicability of the statute of limitations
(Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 83, par. 14) and the Uniform Single Publication Act
(Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 126, par. 11 et seq.) to a complaint alleging libel.
On December 29, 1975, the plaintiff, the Founding Church of Scientology of
Washington, D. C. (FCS) filed a three-count complaint for libel against the
defendants, American Medical Association of Illinois (AMA), Frank Campion, the
AMA's director of communications, and Ralph Smith, the author of the article,
"Scientology Menace to Mental Health," which appeared in the December 1968
issue of the AMA's monthly magazine, "Today's Health."
Counts I and II of the complaint alleged that the article was defamatory and
libelous, and that after the article appeared in print in December 1968,
Campion and the AMA caused reprints and copies of the article to be delivered,
distributed and published to three named persons with various newspapers on the
east coast, as well as **160 ***7 throughout the United States "within the
past year." In their first count, the FCS claimed actual and punitive damages
for injuries to its reputation and ability to function, while the second count
sought actual and punitive damages on account of malicious, intentional and
willful interference with "plaintiff's contractual relationships with its
members and prospective members."
The trial judge granted the defendants' motion to strike and dismissed
*588 Count I with prejudice. He also granted a similar motion with respect
to Count II, but allowed FCS leave to file an amended count. On January 24,
1977, after again hearing argument and receiving the proposed amended Count II
as well as a proposed amended Count I, the trial judge denied the FCS's
petition to vacate and for leave to file an amended complaint on both counts,
and dismissed the entire cause with prejudice.
On appeal, the FCS contends that (i) the libel count, Count I, was not barred
by the statute of limitations, (ii) the article was not absolutely privileged
under the first amendment, (iii) the article was in fact defamatory, and (iv)
Count II properly alleged a cause of action for the tort of interfering with
contractual relationships. Because the FCS is incorrect in asserting that the
first count of its complaint was not barred by the statute of limitations, it
is unnecessary to discuss the merits of its substantive second and third
contentions on that count. In addition, we must reject the FCS's argument that
its Count II stated a proper cause of action.
The relevant statute of limitations provides:
"Actions for slander, libel or for publication of matter violating the right
of privacy, shall be commenced within one year next after the cause of action
accrued." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 83, par. 14.)
Also in point here is the so-called single publication rule, which has been
codified in this state in the Uniform Single Publication Act:
"No person shall have more than one cause of action for damages for libel or
slander or invasion of privacy or any other tort founded upon any single
publication or exhibition or utterance, such as any one edition of a newspaper
or book or magazine or any one presentation to an audience or any one broadcast
over radio or television or any one exhibition of a motion picture. Recovery
in any action shall include all damages for any such tort suffered by the
plaintiff in all jurisdictions." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 126, par. 11.)
Considered together, these two statutes preclude the FCS's first count claim
for libel.
[1][2] Under the Uniform Single Publication Act, no person is given more
than one cause of action for damages for libel founded on any single
publication, such as one edition of a newspaper or magazine, or one printing of
a book. The rationale for the statute is that the cause of action for libel is
complete at the time of the first publication, and any subsequent appearances
or distributions of copies of the original publication are of no consequence to
the creation or existence of a cause of action, but are only relevant in
computing damages. (Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp. (7th Cir.
1959), 273 F.2d 166.) Thus, the subsequent distribution of existing copies of
an original publication *589 neither creates a fresh cause of action nor
tolls the applicable statute of limitations. As the court stated in Winrod
v. Time, Inc. (1948), 334 Ill.App. 59, 72, 78 N.E.2d 708, 714:
"(T)he release of miscellaneous copies incidental to the general publication
either through the mail or on news stands does not constitute a new publication
or create a new cause of action * * *. The interval of time or a separate sale
should not be the sole determining factor whether the article is a
republication or a repetition of the defamatory material * * * (I)n the case of
a newspaper or magazine 'no conscious intent arises until the defendant
consciously as a second edition republishes the article.' "
**161 ***8 Here, the allegedly defamatory article was published generally
and released in 1968. Neither the FCS's original charge, nor its amended
complaint that a "reprint" of the article was distributed to three journalists,
and other unnamed individuals, were sufficient to give rise to a new cause of
action in 1975, or, under Insull and Winrod, could be considered to constitute
a second edition or new publication in 1975. The three copies released by
Campion in 1975 were mailed on an isolated basis and were nothing more than
miscellaneous copies incidental to the general publication of the article 7
years earlier. To conclude otherwise and consider them a "republication,"
would cause havoc with the law of libel and expose a publisher or author to a
lawsuit years after his article had first been published simply because he or
someone else chose to xerox a copy or two and mail the photocopy to a friend
or, for example, to a magazine as part of a letter to an editor. Exposing the
author or publisher to a libel suit in such an instance would be particularly
unjust as well as unrealistic because the article in question might well be on
file in libraries, and so open to the public anyway.
[3] Accordingly, because the copies mailed 7 years after the original
publication did not constitute a "republication" giving rise to a new cause of
action for libel, the statute of limitations began to run at the time of the
original publication in December 1968. The time for bringing this suit expired
1 year later, and the FCS's first count alleging libel was barred by Illinois'
statute of limitations on libel. Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 83, par. 14.
[4][5][6] We also uphold the judgment dismissing the second count of the
complaint. While the complaint alleged that the defendants' article interfered
with, and caused termination of, FCS's contractual relationship with its actual
and prospective members, the complaint set forth no statements indicating what
contract deserving of legal protection was involved. A complaint which fails
to allege sufficient facts to show the plaintiff is entitled to recovery does
not state a cause of action, and such a deficiency may not be remedied by
liberal construction or by argument. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 110, par. 31;
Fanning v. LeMay (1967), 38 Ill.2d *590 209, 230 N.E.2d 182.) And,
although a complaint need not contain evidentiary matter or allege facts
precisely, it must have enough non-conclusory factual allegations to
demonstrate how the plaintiff has been harmed, and that the harm resulted from
some violation of a legal duty by the defendant. (B. L. Cartage Co. v. City
of Chicago (1976), 35 Ill.App.3d 1055, 342 N.E.2d 733.) In this case, the FCS's
complaint, in failing to set forth what contracts and contractual rights may
have been violated, fell short of meeting the standards which a pleader must
comply with to properly apprise a defendant of the basis for the complaint
against him. The trial judge did not err in dismissing Count II of the FCS's
complaint on the ground it failed to state a cause of action.
Judgment affirmed.
JIGANTI, P. J., and McNAMARA, J., concur.