The CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF NEW YORK, Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
The STATE of New York et al., etc., Respondents-Appellants (two cases).
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
March 23, 1978.
Proceedings were instituted to obtain access to all files of the Commissioner
of Mental Hygiene and the Attorney General concerning petitioner corporation,
its affiliates and its leadership. The Supreme Court, New York County, Arnold
L. Fein and Hyman Korn, JJ., granted the application with limitations, and the
State appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, held,
inter alia, that the trial court's order adequately protected against
inappropriate identification of confidential sources.
Affirmed.
Lupiano, J., dissented and filed opinion.
[1] RECORDS
In proceedings by corporation to require Commissioner of Mental Hygiene and
Attorney General to grant access to all files concerning petitioner and its
affiliates and leadership, trial court's judgment granting such access
adequately protected against inappropriate identification of confidential
sources when it required deletions of names of third parties and names and
addresses of third parties who had written letters to state officers
complaining of petitioner. Public Officers Law ss 84 et seq., 87.
[2] RECORDS
Where, although Attorney General had commenced investigation of church based on
letters of complaint received by it, such investigation resulted in no further
action and there existed no present intention to commence any such further
action, official records relating to church were not exempt from disclosure
under New York Freedom of Information Act as being documents compiled for law
enforcement purposes. Public Officers Law s 87.
**225 D. G. Lubell, New York City, for petitioner-respondent.
R. S. Hammer, New York City, for respondents-appellants.
Before MURPHY, P. J., and LUPIANO, BIRNS, YESAWICH and SANDLER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM DECISION.
Judgments, Supreme Court, New York County, entered on May 26, 1977 and August
29, 1977, respectively, in which petitioner's application pursuant to Public
Officers Law Sections 85-88 for records pertaining to petitioner were granted
with limitations requiring deletions of the names of third parties (Judgment of
May 26, 1977) and the names and addresses of third parties in complaint
letters (Judgment of August 29, 1977) affirmed, without costs and without
disbursements.
Following applications to the respondents pursuant to the Public Officers Law
Sections 85-88 ("Freedom of Information Law"), resulting in making available
some records, but the withholding of most, petitioner commenced these
proceedings, seeking a judgment directing respondents to make available to them
the requested records and documents. The two petitions, one addressed to the
Department of Mental Hygiene, and the second to the Attorney General, resulted
in judgments directing the respective respondents to make available to
petitioner for inspection and copying the records sought, subject to the
limitation in the judgment concerning the Department of Mental Hygiene that the
names of third parties be deleted, and the limitation in the judgment relating
to the Attorney General that the names and addresses of informers who wrote
letters of complaint be deleted. The affidavits before the court sharply
limited the issues presented in the pleadings.
Whatever questions may be thought to have been raised by these determinations
at Special Term have been substantially eliminated by the enactment of a new
Article 6, Public Officers Law, effective January 1, 1978 (L.1977, Ch. 933, s
1) and now controlling, which substantially extends the obligation of
government agencies to make available their records and files. So far as is
now relevant, the only issues remaining are raised by the Attorney General and
involve *943 interpretation of the following pertinent portions of Section
87, Public Officers Law:
"Section 87. Access to agency records
2. Each agency shall, in accordance with its published rules, make available
for public inspection and copying all records, except that such agency may deny
access to records or portions thereof that:
(e) are compiled for law enforcement purposes and which, if disclosed, would:
i. interfere with law enforcement investigations or judicial
proceedings; * * *
**226 iii. identify a confidential source or disclose confidential
information relating to a criminal investigation; * * * "
[1] We are satisfied that the provisions of the judgment below adequately
protect against the inappropriate identification of "a confidential source."
This seems particularly clear since, as was developed on oral argument, the
sources in question are the authors of confidential letters of complaint and it
was the practice of the Attorney General on an on-going basis to communicate
with petitioner with regard to such complaints. It is difficult in this
context to believe that more is necessary to protect the identity of such
people than the deletion of their names and addresses, already required in the
judgment appealed from. The alternatives suggested would effectively undermine
the disclosure purposes of the statutory sections. Nor were any specifics
presented either in the moving papers or on oral argument that support the
conclusion that an in camera inspection of the individual papers would be
helpful on this issue.
[2] As to the further claim that some of the documents sought were compiled
for law enforcement purposes, and if disclosed would interfere with law
enforcement investigations or judicial proceedings, it is apparent from the
facts submitted that the letters of complaint have already been responded to,
have been the subject of inquiry, have resulted in no further action, and that
there presently exists no intention to commence any further action with regard
to them. What we are left with is the wholly speculative proposition that
something may yet turn up, although it has not yet done so in the many years of
the petitioner's existence, that will require some unspecified law enforcement
action, to which these earlier letters may be relevant and that somehow will be
impaired by disclosure.
More than that is surely required to invoke the exception claimed by the
respondents. Neither the papers submitted on behalf of the respondents, nor
the responses to specific inquiries in connection with this area on oral
argument, provide a colorable factual basis for the view that an in camera
inspection would serve any worthwhile purpose. No such inspection, it should
be noted, was suggested by the respondents in the various papers submitted by
them.
Needless to say, we do not doubt, as urged in the thoughtful dissenting
opinion, that there may well be appropriate situations in which in camera
inspection would serve the useful purpose of balancing the rights of private
citizens and organizations with the legitimate needs of government agencies.
All concur except LUPIANO, J., who dissents in a memorandum as follows:
LUPIANO, Justice (dissenting):
Petitioner, The Church of Scientology of New York (L. Ron Hubbard, founder),
instituted these Article 78 proceedings to obtain access to all the files of
the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene and the Attorney General, respondents
herein, concerning the petitioner corporation, its affiliates and its
leadership.[FN*] Respondents gave petitioner access to non-confidential
files. *944 Further disclosure was denied by the Attorney General on the
ground that the records either do not come within the description of Public
Officers Law s 88(1), or are part of the Attorney General's investigative
files, or that their disclosure would invade the privacy of the Attorney
General's informants (Public Officers Law s 88(7)(c)(d)). Similarly, the
Commissioner of Mental Hygiene denied petitioner access as to internal
memoranda and as to those records which had been furnished to him by the
Attorney General for the same reasons urged by the Attorney General.
FN* Petitioner's letter of protest addressed to the Attorney General,
dated October 29, 1975, appeals the refusal of the latter to disclose "all
records on Scientology Churches and Missions, L. Ron Hubbard, Dianetics, et
al." The subject matter of Dianetics and the subject matter with which the
Scientology Churches concern themselves are embraceable within that sphere
of human experience termed Mental Hygiene.
**227 In the proceeding against the Attorney General, Special Term, granted
the application "in the absence of sufficient information concerning the
documents to sustain respondent's refusal to disclose for the reasons stated.
Insofar as the documents sought to be disclosed are complaint letters addressed
to the respondent, disclosure of the contents of said letters is granted but
the names and addresses of the informers shall be excluded from such
disclosure." In opposing the application, the Attorney General declared:
"Heretofore, the Attorney General commenced an investigation into the affairs
of The Church of Scientology, its leadership and related organizations
following the receipt of a number of complaints from members of the public. It
should be emphasized that the Attorney General has no interest in the religious
or philosophical beliefs of the petitioner or any other body, regardless of how
novel or unconventional they may be. However, the law imposes upon the
Attorney General a duty to investigate and prosecute frauds committed in
connection with receipt of funds and fund raising for ostensibly religious and
charitable purposes. The investigation was confined to allegations of such
fraudulent activity. Although the investigation did not disclose evidence
sufficient to warrant the commencement of criminal proceedings, additional
complaints are received from time to time and the file remains open. The
letters of complaints are subject to the common law informers privilege.
Similarly the investigative file is privileged, both at common law and under
the Freedom of Information Law. Disclosure of these records could result in an
unwarranted invasion of the privacy of these informants. Although respondents
have made available to petitioner its non-confidential files, their privileged
records must be protected. The mischief that would be caused by wholesale
disclosure of informants' complaints or investigative files as sought by
petitioner would be highly prejudicial to law enforcement and governmental
administration; something the Freedom of Information Law was never intended to
cause" (Emphasis supplied).
The Freedom of Information Law adopted by New York State effective September
1, 1974, is designed to make available to the public documents generated by and
in the possession of government unless a compelling reason requires their
confidentiality. Concern was expressed in the statute regarding the rights of
those identified by government documents which might be subject to disclosure.
The law authorizes the Committee on Access to Public Documents to spell out
rules to be used in preventing the disclosure of information in violation of a
person's right of privacy. As set forth in Public Officers Law s 89(2)(a),
"The committee on public access to records may promulgate guidelines
regarding deletion of identifying details or withholding of records otherwise
available under this article to prevent unwarranted invasions of personal
privacy. In the absence of such guidelines, an agency may delete identifying
details when it makes records available" (Emphasis supplied).
A further limitation on access to information is set forth in Public Officers
Law s 87(2), which declares:
"Each agency shall . . . make available for public inspection and copying
all records, except that such agency *945 may deny access to records or
portions thereof that: . . . (b) if disclosed would constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy under the provisions of subdivision two of section
eighty-nine of this article; . . . (e) are compiled for law enforcement
purposes and which, if disclosed, would: i. interfere with law enforcement
investigations . . . iii. identify a confidential source or disclose
confidential information relating to a criminal investigation; or iv. reveal
criminal investigative techniques or procedures, except routine techniques and
procedures; (f) if disclosed would endanger the life or safety of any person;
(g) are inter-agency or intra-agency materials which are not: i. statistical or
factual **228 tabulations or data; ii. instructions to staff that affect the
public; or iii. final agency policy or determinations . . .."
It is pointed out by the Attorney General that although at present a criminal
prosecution is not warranted, petitioner remains under active scrutiny and
complaints continue to be received by the Attorney General. As a consequence
of evidence that may be gathered in the future, argues the Attorney General,
items currently in the files may assume vital importance. In essence, the
issue is framed as to whether the investigative file is completed and closed,
in effect, a "dead" file, or whether it is an open, viable file, albeit a
dormant one which, if subject to disclosure, would result in interference with
the law enforcement investigative function of the Attorney General's Office.
In this connection, it must be noted that petitioner in seeking access to the
Attorney General's records implicitly recognizes the exemptions to such access
delineated in the Public Officers Law. Petitioner in paragraph "14" of the
petition states:
"The conduct of Respondents, insofar as the records withheld by Respondents
do not constitute files 'compiled for law enforcement purposes' constitutes a
violation of The Freedom of Information Law."
Recognition of the spirit and intent of the Freedom of Information Law and the
recognized caveat that the statute is to be liberally interpreted to achieve
its goal, does not mandate judicial legislation weakening the status of
countervailing considerations and rights which prompted the limitations on
access to information specifically enacted by the legislature in its wisdom.
In this regard note is taken of the general observation in a pre-Freedom of
Information Law case that
"Public interest is a flexible term and what constitutes sufficient potential
harm to the public interest so as to render the privilege (of confidentiality
attaching to official information in the hands of governmental agencies)
operable must of necessity be determined on the facts of each case. Such a
determination is a judicial one and requires that the governmental agency come
forward and show that the public interest would indeed be jeopardized by a
disclosure of the information. Otherwise, the privilege could be easily
abused, serving as a cloak for official misconduct. . . . Of course, in some
situations it may be difficult to determine if the assertion of the privilege
is warranted without forcing a disclosure of the very thing sought to be
withheld. In such situations, it would seem proper that the material requested
be examined by the court in camera" (Cirale v. 80 Pine St. Corp., 35 N.Y.2d
113, 118-119, 359 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5, 316 N.E.2d 301, 304 (1974)).
The public policy benefit in not discouraging private citizens from making
complaint or informing as to observed criminal activity to the proper
authorities is self-evident. On numerous occasions, the courts have commented
upon the duties of citizenship and the responsibilities attendant thereon. As
an example, the Court of Appeals stated in People v. Hicks, 38 N.Y.2d 90,
94, 378 N.Y.S.2d 660, 664, 341 N.E.2d 227, 230 (1975):
"The average citizen who provides the authorities with information as to
observed criminal activity does so with no expectation of private gain.
Rather, he aids the police in enforcing the laws in order to promote the safety
and order of the society as a whole. . . . "
While mindful of the reality of *946 the public's right to know insofar as
this right has found utterance in the Freedom of Information Law, the concern
expressed for protecting the legitimacy of the right to privacy and the state's
compelling interest in maintaining the integrity of investigatory files and of
criminal justice files, mandates under the circumstances herein an in camera
inspection by the court so that an informed determination can be made as to
whether the records sought by petitioner pertain to law enforcement purposes,
the disclosure of which would interfere with law enforcement investigation. We
must **229 be mindful that the expansion of one right in this case the
public's right to know under the Freedom of Information Law might well toll the
confinement of other rights, for example, the right of privacy, in the delicate
balancing of private as compared or contrasted with public issues and/or
persons.
It is, therefore, concluded that Special Term regarding the right of privacy
limitation erred in limiting deletion of merely the names and addresses of the
informers and complainants from complaint letters in the documents sought to be
disclosed. In accordance with the Freedom of Information Law all identifying
details necessary to prevent unwarranted invasion of personal privacy should be
deleted from any information sought to be disclosed and such deletion should
not be merely limited to complaint letters. Further, insofar as the records
sought to be disclosed are compiled for law enforcement purposes, the
disclosure of which would interfere with law enforcement investigation, an in
camera inspection of the records is in order to protect the legitimate interest
of the public in safeguarding the integrity of the investigative process. The
disclosure by the Attorney General of "sufficient information concerning the
documents to sustain (the Attorney General's) refusal to disclose for the
reasons stated," may well compromise the integrity of the investigative
process. It was incumbent upon Special Term to make an "in camera" inspection
so that its determination would be an informed one. Common sense and reason
dictate that such in camera inspection would best comport with protecting the
competing interests and rights under the Freedom of Information Law.
Regarding the Article 78 proceeding against the Commissioner of Mental
Hygiene, Special Term, granted the application. In rendering its
determination, Special Term pertinently observed that the Commissioner refused
to divulge "material received from the Attorney General with instructions to
retain confidentiality, internal working memoranda of a confidential nature,
and communications received from third parties, some of whom are alleged to
have been representatives of the petitioner." The basis enunciated by Special
Term for permitting access to this material was the Commissioner's admission
that he is not conducting any activity with respect to petitioner and maintains
no records with respect to petitioner. Concluding that there was no "real and
active ongoing investigation," Special Term declared that there was no
justification for withholding the information provided the identity of third
parties was protected.
The observations delineated above in respect of the proceeding involving the
Attorney General apply equally to this proceeding. The Freedom of Information
Law as originally enacted was recently reported and replaced by a (New) Freedom
of Information Law, effective January 1, 1978 (L.1977, c. 933). The sponsor of
this law stated in the memorandum in support of the new act that it
"(m)andates that all records be open except: . . . 2. those records which
would be an invasion of privacy . . . 5. law enforcement
investigations . . .. In camera inspection of records together with the
possible assessment of attorneys fees are existing powers given the courts
which are contained in this legislation . . .. The main purpose of these
amendments are to clarify, streamline and better *947 effectuate the
original intent of this legislation. Basically, this legislation will conform
New York State's version of Freedom of Information to the Federal law."
The federal statute which is analogous to New York's Freedom of Information
Law and to which New York's version conforms specifically provides for in
camera inspection "On complaint, the district court of the United States . . .
has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to
order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the
complainant. In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo, and
may examine the contents of such agency records in camera to determine whether
such records or any part thereof **230 shall be withheld under any of the
exemptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section, and the burden is on
the agency to sustain its action" (5 U.S.C.A. s 552(a)(4)(B)). Exempt
material under the federal statute is, insofar as relevant to this matter,
phrased in similar language to New York's statute
"This section does not apply to matters that are . . . (7) investigatory
records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the
production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement
proceedings, . . . (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source . . . ." (5
U.S.C.A. s 552(b)(7)).
Enlightenment may thus be obtained from a review of relevant federal cases.
Initially the request for disclosure should specify identifiable records, i.
e., it should contain a reasonable description of the requested records and not
be vague (See, Bristol-Myers Company v. F. T. C., 138 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 424
F.2d 935 (1970)). The mere fact that an investigatory file is dormant, does
not of itself indicate that it is not related to a viable on-going
investigation and does not remove the file from the exemption provided in the
statute. In Frankel v. Securities and Exchange Commission, the district court
held that the exemption from disclosure pertaining to an investigatory file no
longer applied where the file was not one "compiled for (current) law
enforcement purposes." The Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted that
"(t)he statute on its face does not limit the 'investigatory files' exemption
to files that the agency is currently using or is planning to use in a law
enforcement proceeding. . . . The broad legislative intent behind the
enactment of the Freedom of Information Act, as disclosed by the Report of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary and the Report of the House Committee on
Government Operations, was to give the electorate greater access to information
concerning the operations of the federal government. The ultimate purpose was
to enable the public to have sufficient information in order to be able,
through the electoral process, to make intelligent, informed choices with
respect to the nature, scope, and procedure of federal governmental
activities. . . . The House Report . . . states: 'It is vital to our way of
life to reach a workable balance between the right of the public to know and
the need of the Government to keep information in confidence to the extent
necessary without permitting indiscriminate secrecy. The right of the
individual to be able to find out how his Government is operating can be just
as important to him as his right to privacy and his right to confide in his
Government. This bill strikes a balance considering all these
interests'. . . . (The Senate and House) Reports indicate that Congress had a
two-fold purpose in enacting the exemption for investigatory files: to prevent
the premature disclosure of the results of an investigation so that the
Government can present its strongest case in court, and to keep confidential
the procedures by which the agency conducted its investigation and by which it
has obtained information. Both these forms of confidentiality are necessary
for effective law *948 enforcement. The conclusion that the . . .
exemption from disclosure applies even after an investigation and an
enforcement proceeding have been terminated is supported both by the authority
of the cases decided under the Act and by consideration of the policies
underlying the Act in general and the investigatory files exemption in
particular. In Evans v. Department of Transportation, 446 F.2d 821, 824
(5th Cir.) . . . the court said: 'We are of the further opinion that Congress
could not possibly have intended that such (matter) should be disclosed once an
investigation is completed. If this were so, and disclosure were made, it
would soon become a matter of common knowledge with the result that few
individuals, if any, would come forth to embroil themselves in controversy or
possible recrimination by notifying the (agency) **231 of something which
might justify investigation '. . . . If an agency's investigatory files were
obtainable without limitation after the investigation was concluded, future law
enforcement efforts by the agency could be seriously hindered. . . . The
possibility of such disclosure would tend severely to limit the agencies'
possibilities for investigation and enforcement of the law since these agencies
rely, to a large extent, on voluntary cooperation and on information from
informants. In the present case disclosure would have but small effect with
respect to the general purposes of the Act, the better informing of the
electorate as to the operations of government. On the contrary it would defeat
important purposes of the exemption for investigatory files'' (Frankel v.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 460 F.2d 813, 815-818 (2nd Cir. 1972))
(Emphasis supplied).
The critical fact as to a dormant investigative file determinative of whether
the exemption provision applies is whether such file remains viable as an aid
in a contemplated prospective proceeding (See, Bristol-Myers v. F. T. C.,
supra; Chamberlain v. Alexander, 419 F.Supp. 235 (S.D.Ala.1976); cf.
Weisberg v. U. S. Dept. of Justice, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 71, 489 F.2d 1195
(1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993, 94 S.Ct. 2405, 40 L.Ed.2d 772 (1974);
543 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). Accordingly, it is necessary for the court
where appropriate to apply the balancing test delineated in the federal cases,
coupled when necessary with in camera inspection of the records sought in order
to determine whether the exemption is properly invoked. The focus is on " 'how
and under what circumstances the files were compiled . . . .' " (Aspin v.
Department of Defense, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 491 F.2d 24 (1973)).
To reiterate: petitioner seeks access to all records in the possession of
respondents without any limitation or degree of specificity other than that the
records relate to petitioner, its innumerable affiliates and its leadership.
There has been a disclosure by respondents of information not considered by
them of a confidential investigative nature. Accordingly, inference supports
an initial reflection that respondents are acting in good faith. Exemption is
claimed for letters of complaint received by the Attorney General and related
matters of an investigatory nature relevant to the Attorney General's duty to
investigate and prosecute certain fraudulent activity. The Attorney General
turned over to the Commission of Mental Hygiene certain records which are
claimed to be confidential and related to an investigation of certain
allegations of fraudulent activity. It is specifically stated that the
Attorney General's file "remains open." The mere fact that such information
has been imparted by one agency to another does not of itself remove the
exemption, if it is otherwise operable, particularly where the information is
turned over under a request that its confidential status be respected. The
mere fact that the agency to which the records are turned over is itself not
pursuing an investigatory process respecting such records does not deprive
those records of the exemption if otherwise applicable. Indeed, Public
Officers Law s 87(2)(g) provides a specific exemption for "inter-agency or
intra-agency materials which are *949 not: i. statistical or factual
tabulations or data; ii. instructions to staff that affect the public; or iii.
final agency policy or determinations." As to materials in the files of the
Department of Mental Hygiene which have not been disclosed and which are not
records and papers of the Attorney General, it is urged that the above
exemption controls, i. e., that these materials are all inter- or intra-agency
memoranda not otherwise subject to disclosure.
"It should be observed that the Federal statutes relating to freedom of
access to governmental information are not based upon a fundamental finding
that the public should have unimpaired access to records" (Matter of Dunlea
v. Goldmark, 54 A.D.2d 446, 449, 389 N.Y.S.2d 423, 425 (3rd Dept. 1976)).
In the post-Watergate milieu the understandable zeal to interpret as liberally
as possible the Freedom of Information Act **232 cannot justify a myopic or
one-sided approach which would serve to frustrate the balancing test patently
envisioned by the statutory enactment. Both Congress in enacting the Federal
Freedom of Information Law and the state legislature of New York in enacting
the State's Freedom of Information Law were mindful of the salutary observation
not to cure the patient by killing him. The nature of the right of privacy
which may well be the most threatened right of our present age, the competing
consideration of the public's right to know what government is doing in order
through the electoral process and otherwise to make informed choices with
respect to the value, scope and procedure of governmental activities and the
competing consideration of safeguarding effective law enforcement all warrant,
indeed mandate, a reflective, cautious, albeit liberal approach in applying the
Freedom of Information Law. We must be careful not to abuse rights or reject
countervailing duties in invoking the Freedom of Information Law. Eternal
vigilance is the price of liberty and vigilance in applying the law is not
remiss.
Respondents clearly oppose what they perceive as an unbridled, unlimited raid
on their confidential files and records and invoke the protection of the
Freedom of Information Law, the very law relied upon by petitioner to justify
access to such files and records. We assume "(t)here is no evidence in this
record, other than the conclusory affidavit of the respondents, to confirm
these claims of exemptions. It has been held under the Federal statute that
conclusory affidavits claiming a right to an exemption will not alone defeat a
request for disclosure (see Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410
U.S. 73, 93, 93 S.Ct. 827, 35 L.Ed.2d 119, Vaughn v. Rosen (157 U.S.App.D.C.
340, 484 F.2d 820, cert. den. 415 U.S. 977, 94 S.Ct. 1564, 39 L.Ed.2d
873)). A New York court, while recognizing that investigatory files must
remain confidential, went on to state:
(B)ut that does not mean that a general statement . . . that records are
confidential or part of an investigatory file . . . must result in
dismissal . . . . (I)t would frustrate the intent and policy of the Freedom of
Information Law to permit a public official to determine according to his own
judgment what is, or is not, confidential and to withhold disclosure
accordingly (Matter of Dillon v. Cahn, 79 Misc.2d 300, 303, 359 N.Y.S.2d
981, 984, citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41
L.Ed.2d 1039). In the instant case the minutes sought by the petitioners have
not been reviewed in camera and there are no detailed affidavits or other
exhibits that would show the type of information generally contained in these
minutes. While an agency should be accorded an opportunity to prove by means
other than an in camera inspection that they are entitled to an exemption, if
they fail to provide such detailed information an in camera inspection of the
documents sought should be performed (Vaughn v. Rosen, supra; see, Cirale
v. 80 Pine St. Corp., 35 N.Y.2d (113) p. 119, 359 N.Y.S.2d (1) p. 5, 316
N.E.2d (301) p. 304, supra; Matter of Dillon v. Cahn, supra )
" (Zuckerman v. Bd. of Parole, 53 A.D.2d 405, 408, 385 N.Y.S.2d 811, 813
(3rd Dept. 1976)).
Accordingly, the judgments of the Supreme Court, New York County entered May
6, 1977 and entered August 29, *950 1977, granting petitioner's application
for access to records under the Freedom of Information Law should be reversed,
on the law and the facts, without costs, and the proceedings remanded to the
Supreme Court for an in camera inspection of the requested documents and for
further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.