The CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY OF MINNESOTA, Appellant,
v.
MINNESOTA STATE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION FOUNDATION, et al., Respondents,
John LaBree, etc., et al., Defendants,
American Medical Association, Respondent.
No. 47457.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
March 17, 1978.
Religious organization brought action for libel against magazine publisher,
its employees and author, whose magazine article pertained to such religion,
and also sought to recover against association, which had supplied a copy of
the article in response to a request, and to recover against others. The
District Court, Ramsey County, Harold W. Schultz, J., granted defendants
summary judgment, and religious organization appealed. The Supreme Court,
Peterson, J., held that: (1) person claiming damages from mass-produced libel
must bring his action against original publisher, its employees and author
within two years of original publication; (2) action against magazine
publisher, its employees and author was barred by two-year statute of
limitations; (3) magazine article was defamatory on its face, and (4) acts of
an organization and its officers, in merely supplying a copy of article in
response to request, did not constitute republication of the article.
Affirmed.
[1] LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
Person claiming damage from mass-produced libel must bring his action against
original publisher, its employees and author within two years of original
publication; statute of limitations does not begin to run anew on
republication. M.S.A. s 541.07.
[2] LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
Action against magazine publisher, its employees and author of magazine article
to recover for libelous statements allegedly made in such article was barred by
two-year statute of limitations where, though the action was brought less than
two years after an association sent State Department of Commerce a copy of such
article, the action was brought more than two years after the article was first
published. M.S.A. s 541.07.
[3] LIBEL AND SLANDER
Words are "defamatory" when they tend to injure the plaintiff's reputation
and expose the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt, ridicule or degradation.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
[4] LIBEL AND SLANDER
In construing language of alleged libel as set forth in complaint, courts must
give it its obvious and natural meaning.
[5] LIBEL AND SLANDER
Magazine article, which indicated that certain religion was not a bona fide
religion or nonprofit organization, that it had seriously harmed health of
persons seeking its aid and had induced mental illness and that churches of
such religion had fraudulently and dishonestly obtained large sums of money for
the founder's personal gain, was defamatory on its face.
[6] LIBEL AND SLANDER
Statements charging another with fraud or dishonesty are defamatory regardless
of the terms in which they are couched.
[7] LIBEL AND SLANDER
"Publication" is a term of art in defamation law expressing one of the
elements of that tort.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
[8] LIBEL AND SLANDER
Those who merely deliver or transmit defamatory material previously published
by another will be considered to have published the material only if they knew,
or had reason to know, that the material was false and defamatory.
[9] LIBEL AND SLANDER
Acts of organization and its officers, in merely supplying a copy of a
previously published magazine article in response to a request, did not
constitute "republication" of the article so as to permit any recovery
against such organization and officers on theory that article was libelous.
See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
*153 SYLLABUS
1. Under Minn.St. 541.07, those who claim damage from mass-produced libel
must bring an action against the original publisher, its employees, and the
author within 2 years of the original publication.
2. Where an organization and its officers do no more than supply a copy of a
previously published article in response to a request, their acts are analogous
to those of a library or news vendor and do not constitute republication of the
article.
Daniel Zeddies and William Starr, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Geraghty, O'Loughlin & Kenney and David C. Hutchinson, St. Paul, for Minn. St.
Med. Assoc.
Jardine, Logan & O'Brien, Donald M. Jardine and Kent E. Charpentier, St. Paul,
for Am. Med. Assoc.
Heard before ROGOSHESKE, PETERSON and WAHL, JJ., and considered and decided by
the court en banc.
PETERSON, Justice.
Plaintiff, The Church of Scientology of Minnesota, brought this action for
libel and appeals from the summary judgment granted to all defendants. We
affirm as to some defendants on the ground that the action is barred by the
statute of limitations and as to the remaining defendants on the ground that
their acts do not constitute publication of a libel.
The complaint alleges that Scientology is a religion which was founded in 1952
by L. Ron Hubbard. Hubbard is an advisor to Churches of Scientology, and his
name and reputation have been closely identified with Scientology. In March
1974, the Office of Consumer Services of the Minnesota Department of Commerce
requested information from defendant Minnesota State Medical Association (MSMA)
concerning Scientology. In response to this request, defendant Harold W.
Brunn, acting in his capacity as executive secretary of MSMA,[FN1] sent the
*154 office several newspaper clippings and a copy of an article written by
defendant Ralph Lee Smith entitled "Scientology Menace to Mental Health." This
article had appeared in the December 1968 issue of Today's Health, a lay-
oriented magazine which is published by defendant American Medical Association
(AMA).[FN2] MSMA also sent a copy of the article to "Action Line," a column in
the St. Paul Dispatch newspaper, in response to its request, although it is
unclear when this copy was sent.
FN1. Harold W. Brunn is an official in both MSMA and the Minnesota State
Medical Association Foundation. Due to an excusable error, the complaint
named the Foundation rather than MSMA as the organization responsible for
sending the article to the Office of Consumer Affairs. Plaintiff's motion
to amend its complaint to correct the error was denied by the district
court as moot when summary judgment was granted to defendants. For
purposes of this appeal, we will consider plaintiff's motion to have been
granted since it was clearly proper under Rule 21, Rules of Civil
Procedure.
FN2. Plaintiff alleges that the circulation of Today's Health exceeds
750,000 per issue and that statements made in Today's Health are widely
believed by the general public to be true.
Plaintiff alleges that the article in its entirety is false and defamatory but
refers particularly to 11 portions of the article which by direct statement and
implication convey the meaning that Scientology is not a bona fide religious or
nonprofit organization, that Scientology has seriously harmed the health of
persons seeking its aid and has induced mental illness, and that Churches of
Scientology have fraudulently or dishonestly obtained large sums of money for
Hubbard's personal gain.[FN3] Plaintiff also alleges that each of the
defendants acted with knowledge of the falsity of the statements made in the
article or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity.[FN4]
FN3. Plaintiff cites the following passages from the article: (1)
"Scientology Menace to Mental Health," the article's title; (2) "dangerous
cult," referring to Scientology; (3) "Scientology has grown into a very
profitable world-wide enterprise . . . " and (4) "thrives on glowing
promises that are heady stuff for the lonely, the weak, the confused, the
ineffectual, and the mentally or emotionally ill"; (5) "Whatever the actual
figures may be, it is clear that large numbers of persons are responding to
Scientology's promise of a quick, easy road to mental and emotional health.
Unfortunately, the road may lead not to health but to tragedy and disaster
for themselves and their families"; (6) "Police records cite the case of
one wealthy Floridian who spent some $28,000 on Scientology processing";
(7) "The Scientology movement is coordinated and governed through the
'Hubbard Communication Office World Wide' (HCO-WW) at Saint Hill. This
office distributes Hubbard's decision, policies, dicta, and accounts of
such things as his visits to heaven. It is also Hubbard's vigilant
international collection agency, raking in a slice of the action wherever
preclears are being processed"; (8) "Instead of discussing present reality,
the auditor wishes to push the preclear into a world of fantasy," referring
to persons receiving spiritual counseling; (9) "Sooner or later he begins
to exhibit symptoms resembling those of schizophrenia. These symptoms are
encouraged * * * ," referring to persons receiving Scientology counseling;
(10) " * * * Scientology keeps the patient in this illusory state and
exploits it for profit," referring to alleged reverence towards persons
directing the Scientology Centers, and toward L. Ron Hubbard; (11) "Before
it finally goes the way of all cults, Scientology may leave behind a legacy
of tragedy unmatched in the annals of fads and fallacies in mental health."
FN4. Plaintiff has repeatedly alleged that statements made in the article
are false. Defendants have not alleged the truth of the statements as a
defense, and in any event plaintiff's allegations of falsity must be
accepted for purposes of defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Gadach v. Benton County Co-op Assn., 236 Minn. 507, 53 N.W.2d 230
(1952).
The district court granted summary judgment to AMA, its employees, and the
author on the ground that the action was barred by Minn.St. 541.07, the 2-
year statute of limitations for libel and slander actions. Summary judgment
was granted to MSMA and its officers (the remaining defendants) on the grounds
that the article was not defamatory, that these defendants had not republished
the article, and that their actions were protected by both a qualified
constitutional privilege and a common-law privilege. On appeal, plaintiff
argues that summary judgment was not proper on any of these grounds.
1. We turn first to the question of whether the statute of limitations bars
plaintiff's action against AMA, its employees, and the author. In Wild v.
Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 234 N.W.2d 775 (1975), appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 902,
96 S.Ct. 1093, 47 L.Ed.2d 307 (1976), we held that the 2-year period of
limitations begins to run when the allegedly defamatory material is published
and will not be tolled simply because the plaintiff lacked knowledge of the
publication. In this case, plaintiff's action was *155 filed in October
1975, more than 5 years after the article in question was first published.
Thus, the action against the defendants involved in the first publication AMA,
its employees, and the author is clearly barred unless for some reason the
statute of limitations was tolled or began to run anew at a later date.
Plaintiff contends that for purposes of suit against both AMA and MSMA the
statute of limitations began to run anew in March 1974, when MSMA "republished"
the article. This is the so-called "multiple-publication rule" embodied in the
common-law rule that each repetition of a libel constitutes a separate and
distinct publication giving rise to a cause of action.[FN5] In contrast,
defendants urge us instead to adopt the so-called "single-publication rule"
which originated in New York and has been adopted by several other
jurisdictions and the American Law Institute.[FN6] Under the "single-
publication rule," the statute of limitations begins to run when a mass-
produced newspaper, book, or magazine is first released to the public, and the
statutory period for actions against the original publisher will not begin to
run again as a result of subsequent incidental republications. Winrod v.
Time, Inc., 334 Ill.App. 59, 78 N.E.2d 708 (1948); Polchlopek v. American
News Co., Inc., 73 F.Supp. 309 (D.Mass.1947); Means v. MacFadden
Publications, Inc., 25 F.Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y.1939).
FN5. E. g., see, Lewis v. Reader's Digest Assn. Inc., 162 Mont. 401,
512 P.2d 702 (1973); Hartman v. American News Co., 69 F.Supp. 736
(W.D.Wis.1947).
FN6. Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254 App.Div. 211, 4 N.Y.S.2d
640 (1938), affirmed, 279 N.Y. 716, 18 N.E.2d 676 (1939); Annotation,
42 A.L.R.3d 807, 815; Restatement, Torts 2d, s 577A.
[1][2] This court has never had occasion to consider which rule should be
applied in Minnesota.[FN7] Even if we were to assume that MSMA's acts
constitute republication of the article, the present case persuades us that
the "single-publication rule" is the better rule because it reflects the facts
of modern-day mass publishing and duplicating and gives effect to the policy of
repose underlying the statute of limitations. Plaintiff has alleged that over
750,000 copies of the article were published by AMA. With this number of
copies in existence, occasional republications inevitably occur. If every such
republication started anew the period for bringing actions against the original
publisher, then the 2-year statute of limitations would be rendered a nullity.
To avoid that unreasonable result, we hold that s 541.07 requires those who
claim damage from mass-produced libel to bring their actions against the
original publisher within 2 years of the original publication. We accordingly
affirm summary judgment in favor of AMA, its employees, and the author on the
ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations.
FN7. Plaintiff cites Zier v. Hoflin, 33 Minn. 66, 21 N.W. 862 (1885),
but no statute of limitations issue was raised in that case. Zier stands
for the proposition that in assessing damages the factfinder may consider
foreseeable republications of a libel which are the natural consequences of
a defendant's original publication.
2. Turning to plaintiff's action against MSMA and its officers, we need only
consider whether the article is defamatory and whether MSMA and its officers
published it.
[3][4][5][6] Words are defamatory when they tend to injure the plaintiff's
reputation and expose the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, or
degradation. Gadach v. Benton County Co-op Assn., 236 Minn. 507, 53 N.W.2d
230 (1952). Words may be divided into those that cannot possibly have a
defamatory meaning; those that are reasonably susceptible to a defamatory
meaning as well as an innocent one; and those that are clearly defamatory on
their face. Morey v. Barnes, 212 Minn. 153, 2 N.W.2d 829 (1942); 11A
Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) s 5509. In construing the language of the alleged libel
as set forth in the complaint, courts must give it its obvious and natural
meaning. Jones v. Monico, 276 Minn. 371, 150 N.W.2d 213 (1967). Under
these standards, the article in question is defamatory on its *156 face,
since statements charging another with fraud or dishonesty are defamatory
regardless of the terms in which they are couched. Uhlman v. Farm, Stock
and Home Co.,126 Minn. 239, 148 N.W. 102 (1914).
[7][8] We turn then to the question of whether the acts of MSMA and its
officers constitute republication of the article. "Publication" is a term of
art in defamation law expressing one of the elements of that tort. Those who
merely deliver or transmit defamatory material previously published by another
will be considered to have published the material only if they knew, or had
reason to know, that the material was false and defamatory. See, Restatement,
Torts 2d, s 581. It is this rule that protects libraries and vendors of books,
magazines, and newspapers. Hartmann v. American News Co., 171 F.2d 581 (7
Cir. 1948); Balabanoff v. Fossani, 192 Misc. 615, 81 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1948).
[9] In this case, MSMA and its officers merely acted as a conduit between
the original publisher and the parties who had requested information. The
article's original publisher was known to be reputable, therefore MSMA and its
officers had no reason to believe that the article was false and defamatory.
In these circumstances, the acts of MSMA and its officers were analogous to
those of a library or news vendor and did not constitute publication.
Because summary judgment for MSMA and its officers was proper on this ground,
we need not reach defendants' claims to the protection of a qualified
constitutional and a common-law privilege.
We need not, furthermore, reach the critical question of who would have borne
the burden of proving the truth or falsity of the article's statements had the
case gone to trial. Under the common law, it was consistently held that
defamatory statements will be presumed false and that the defendant bears the
burden of proving their truth as a defense.[FN8] This view is consistent with
the common law's concern for the plaintiff's reputation, and it recognizes the
difficulty of proving a negative, such as the untruth of a statement.[FN9]
However, the common-law view that the defendant bears the burden of proving the
truth of the statement does not easily mesh with constitutional
considerations. The United States Supreme Court's decisions since New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), hold that
a plaintiff must show fault by the defendant regarding the truth or falsity of
the defamatory communication, and where the plaintiff is a public figure or
public official, he must show that the defendant knew the communication was
false or acted with reckless disregard as to whether it was false.[FN10] For a
public-figure or public-official plaintiff to meet these requirements, he must,
as a practical matter, assume the burden of proving that the communication was
false. This is, of course, contrary to the common-law view. The American Law
Institute has expressly withheld an opinion on this problem. Restatement,
Torts 2d, s 613, Caveat and Comment j. Since the present case does not require
us to resolve this difficulty, we merely note its presence for future
consideration.
FN8. Wilcox v. Moore, 69 Minn. 49, 71 N.W. 917 (1897); Gadach v.
Benton County Co-op Assn. supra; Prosser, Torts (4 ed.), s 116, and note
10.
FN9. As an illustration, were a storekeeper to bring an action based on a
newspaper statement that he shortchanges his customers when he gets a
chance, it would be extremely difficult for the storekeeper to prove that
the statement was false.
FN10. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41
L.Ed.2d 789 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 96 S.Ct. 958,
47 L.Ed.2d 154 (1976). The leading Minnesota case is Rose v. Koch, 278
Minn. 235, 154 N.W.2d 409 (1967). See, also, Anderson v. Kammeier,
Minn., note 5, 262 N.W.2d 366, 372 (filed November 18, 1977); and Note,
3 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 81 (1977).
Affirmed.
OTIS, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.